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Abstract
This paper is a critical response to Andreas Bartels’ (2006) sophisticated defense of
a structural account of scientific representation. We show that, contrary to Bartels’
claim, homomorphism fails to account for the phenomenon of misrepresentation. Bar-
tels claims that homomorphism is adequate in two respects. First, it is conceptually
adequate, in the sense that it shows how representation differs from misrepresentation
and non-representation. Second, if properly weakened, homomorphism is formally ad-
equate to accommodate misrepresentation. We question both claims. First, we show
that homomorphism is not the right condition to distinguish representation from mis-
representation and non-representation: a “representational mechanism” actually does
all the work, and it is independent of homomorphism – as of any structural condition.
Second, we test the claim of formal adequacy against three typical kinds of inaccurate
representation in science which, by reference to a discussion of the notorious billiard ball
model, we define as abstraction, pretence, and simulation. We first point out that Bar-
tels equivocates between homomorphism and the stronger condition of epimorphism,
and that the weakened form of homomorphism that Bartels puts forward is not a mor-
phism at all. After providing a formal setting for abstraction, pretence and simulation,
we show that for each morphism there is at least one form of inaccurate representa-
tion which is not accommodated. We conclude that Bartels’ theory – while logically
laying down the weakest structural requirements – is nonetheless formally inadequate
in its own terms. This should shed serious doubts on the plausibility of any structural
account of representation more generally.
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1 Structural Approaches
There is by now a long tradition of structural approaches to scientific representation, start-
ing in van Fraassen (1980) and Suppes (1967) to the most sophisticated recent accounts by
Pincock (2012) and Bartels (2006). The tradition’s critics (Giere 1999, Frigg 2006, Sua´rez
2003, van Fraassen 2008, Contessa 2011) have invoked putative counterexamples to struc-
tural notions, displaying instances of scientific modeling where a model B is accepted as
a representation of some object, system or process A, while failing to hold the required
structural morphism relation to A. As a response, defenders of structural accounts have
progressively weakened their constraints, from isomorphism to embedding, partial isomor-
phism and, most recently, to homomorphism. (Van Fraassen was both an early proponent,
and nowadays a critic, at least in the terms defended here).
It is unclear in these papers what precise claims are being made on behalf of structural
mapping or morphisms, and what exactly is the work that structures are supposed to
perform.1 More worryingly, perhaps, the notion of structure itself remains imprecise and
elusive. But whatever else is claimed on behalf of structural morphism, it is clear that the
point of providing a structural account of representation is to provide some elucidation,
however partial, of the central notion of scientific representation. Hence we shall take it
that any structural account of representation is minimally committed to the claim that
representation in science is a relation that is appropriately characterized or described as a
kind of structural mapping or morphism. And indeed most authors in the tradition have
invoked structural isomorphism and its variants as part of an analysis of representation.
Thus for instance, it is claimed that:
[T]o understand how an organism performs well using a certain representa-
tional system we have to consider the specific contents of the representation
and how they relate to its reference objects. Content is a necessary component
of representation, and homomorphisms are necessary to explain this necessary
component. (Bartels 2006, 17)
The evidence for these claims and their reach remains nonetheless surprisingly unclear. It
is in particular often unclear, as we shall point out in this article, whether isomorphism
and its cousins are intended to provide an analysis of the notion of representation itself, or
whether they are merely intended to describe some of the ways in which representation in
science achieves some of its characteristic ends, such as for instance, the aim of accuracy.
In other words, it is unclear whether structural mappings or morphisms are constitutive of
representation in science, or merely some efficient means for representation to achieve its
ends. Defenders of the structural accounts are often imprecise in shifting from evidence for
the weaker case to claims in favor of the stronger constitutive claim. But the inference from
1We are using the term morphism to refer to any structural mapping regardless of the kind of transfer
of structure from A to B that it implies. Therefore the term should not be understood as a synonym for
homomorphism, which is at best the basic, or most elementary, form a morphism can take.
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the former to the latter claim is invalid, since the problem of representation and the problem
of accurate representation are by now well-known to be distinct (Callender and Cohen 2006,
Contessa 2007, Frigg 2006). We believe that there is so far no good argument to the effect
that the evidence for the weaker claim (that structural morphisms are typically involved
in the assessment of the accuracy of many mathematical representations in science) is also
evidence for the stronger claim (that structural morphisms are constitutive of the nature of
scientific representation, i.e. that a structural account of representation is correct). There
are powerful independent arguments against the stronger claim (see Frigg 2006, Sua´rez 2003)
that recommend a skeptical attitude to structural accounts of scientific representation in
general.
In this paper we analyze the most sophisticated and plausible structuralist account of
representation to date, namely Andreas Bartels’ (2006) homomorphism account. The ac-
count’s main virtue is the alleged capacity of homomorphism to account for the phenomena
of misrepresentation, and indeed we believe this to be one of the greatest stumbling blocks
for structural accounts. Hence we begin in Section 2 by reviewing the problem of misrep-
resentation in scientific modelling, in both the mistargetting and inaccuracy varieties. As
an illustration of the latter, we briefly discuss the essential features of an elementary yet
influential historical case of scientific modeling: the billiard ball model of gases. We argue
that there are three ways in which scientific models typically misrepresent, and we refer
to them as abstraction, pretence and simulation. We provide bare structural character-
izations for all of them in terms of simple structural renditions of their representational
sources and targets. We argue on the basis of the billiard ball model that scientific models
abstract, many pretend, and some simulate; but that this does not take away any of their
descriptive, predictive and explanatory value. Then in Section 3 we summarize Bartels’
homomorphism theory of representation and review his claim that this theory accounts
for misrepresentation. We point out the essential role adjudicated by Bartels to what he
calls the “representational mechanism’. Representational mechanisms have a crucial role
for representation (and misrepresentation) to occur and, since these mechanisms are inde-
pendent of any structural mapping, we argue that misrepresentation is not accounted fully
in structural terms. This particularly holds for mistargetting as presented in (Sua´rez 2003)
In Section 4 we dispute the claim that misrepresentation as inaccuracy is accommodated
within Bartels’ structural account. We first point out that what Bartels calls homomorphism
is in fact a stronger notion, namely epimorphism. We then show that epimorphism can not
account for either abstraction, pretence or simulation. Turning to homomorphism proper,
which is an extremely weak structural constraint, amounting to the relation technically
known as completeness, we show that it can accommodate pretence kinds of misrepresen-
tation, but not abstraction. Since we argue that most if not all scientific models abstract,
it follows that even the weakest notion of structural morphism is too strong for scientific
representation. The formal result is summarized in a table in the final section. In the
concluding section, we admonish philosophers to take greater care with structural accounts
of representation – while structural morphisms may provide good and valuable resources to
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assess the accuracy of many mathematical models in science, they can not actually account
for the very relation of representation.
2 Misrepresentation: Mistargetting and Inaccuracy
“Scientific representations misrepresent”: This is one of the main points of agreement in
the recent literature on scientific representation. Any philosophical theory or account of
scientific representation must not only accommodate but also explain minimally how rep-
resentations fail to accurately characterize or describe their entire subject. Representations
always simplify to some degree: this is at the heart of why they are useful in practice.2
Thus it would be a major objection to any philosophical account of representation that it
does not account for misrepresentation. This has often been an issue for structural accounts
– since on such accounts the conditions for the accuracy of a representation (the ‘matching’
of relations and properties at the source and target end) are also the very conditions for
establishing the relationship of representation in the first place. This is most evident an
objection to isomorphism accounts, and the relevant question for us is the extent to which
the objection can be answered by means of suitable weakenings of the isomorphism relation.
Yet, there is a stronger form that the objection may take, which we would like to consider
in this section.
The stronger objection begins with the observation that there are distinct forms of mis-
representation and that these pose significantly different challenges for structural accounts.
Two main kinds were already identified in Sua´rez (2003) and referred to there as mistar-
getting and inaccuracy. A model may misrepresent by being applied to the wrong target,
perhaps as a result of having been mistakenly taken to be a different model in some par-
ticular context. The model’s target is selected as part of the normative practice of model
building that gives rise to it, but a particular agent may, perhaps out of lack of information
or competence, apply it to the wrong target. The model is in that very context misrepre-
senting in a rather strong sense: it is used as a representation of a system or object that it
is not intended for. We return to the issue later on in addressing whether Bartels’ account
actually provides necessary and sufficient conditions for representation, and whether these
conditions can in some sense be thought to be ‘structural’. For now, we focus only on
the varieties of inaccurate misrepresentation. More specifically we discuss three forms that
inaccuracy can take, and which we refer to as abstraction, pretence, and simulation.
The rough and ready definition of these terms is as follows: An abstraction essentially
neglects some of the features of the target system it is about; a pretence ascribes to the
target system features that this does not possess; a simulation both abstracts and pretends:
it both neglects some of the actual features of the system and ascribes features to the system
that it does not possess. We discuss these distinctions in relation to one of the best known
and most widely discussed examples of an analogical model in the history of philosophy of
2Jorge Luis Borges’ wonderful discussion of the one-to-one scale map is an exemplary parody of how a
perfectly accurate representation is also perfectly useless (Borges 1954).
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science, namely the so-called ‘billiard ball model’ (Hesse 1970). Hesse presents this model
as consisting of a negative, positive and neutral analogy between macroscopic billiard balls
and gas molecules in a container. Thus in her famous dialogue between the Duhemist and
the Campbellian, the Campbellian lists the properties of billiard balls and classifies them in
three groups in relation with the analogy with gas molecules. In the negative analogy (the
properties that pertain to billiard balls but not gas molecules) there are colour, hardness,
brightness; in the positive analogy (the properties that billiard balls and gas molecules
share) there are motion and impact. But there is a third group of properties that constitute
what Hesse calls the neutral analogy. These are in the words of Hesse’s Campbellian, “the
properties of the model about which we do not yet know whether they are positive or
negative analogies: These are the interesting properties, because [...] they allow us to make
new predictions.” (Hesse 1970, 8).
Now, Hesse does not describe them, but there is a further group of properties of interest
in the analogical relationship between billiard balls and gases; these are the properties of
the gas that are most definitely not properties of billiard balls. For instance, the billiard
ball model captures microscopic features of elastic collisions between gas molecules to some
extent, but it does not say anything informative regarding the macroscopic features of
the gas, such as volume, density and pressure. We find ways to draw inferences to those
macroscopic properties from the fully developed kinematical theory of gases, but there are
no correlates in a system of billiard balls for such properties. What’s more, the billiard
ball model is positively misleading as a guide for such properties, since there is no relation
in a system of billiard balls between average speed of the balls and the pressure exerted
outwards by the system. Obviously the missing ingredient is free expansion, which is
a thermodynamically irreversible property of any system of gas molecules, but has no
equivalent or corresponding property in any dynamical feature of elastic collisions between
classical particles or massive bodies, such as billiard balls. We could call this the ‘inverse
negative analogy’ (or negative analogy ‘by denial’): they are the properties that pertain to
gas molecules but not billiard balls. They may even be explicitly denied for billiard balls
(as indeed is the case with free expansion).
In fact, as some careful reading will reveal, the inverse negative analogy is of particular
relevance in Campbell’s original discussion of the example (see Campbell 1957). And there
is some sense to this. Hesse had her own reasons to suppress the discussion of the inverse
negative analogy which could only take away from the neutral analogy which she deemed
fundamental. It is well known that her chief aim was to defend the thesis that the neutral
analogy was key to the heuristics of research, and fully informed its logic. Campbell,
however, was mainly preocuppied with the relation between theory and measurement, and
more particularly with the theoretical presuppositions underlying measurement procedures.
In this context the inverse negative analogy is relevant, for the macroscopic thermodynamic
properties in question are measurable in the laboratory, while the internal microscopic
properties of the gas can only by hypothesized or inferred from observation via the model.
There are further interesting differences between Hesse’s discussion of Campbell’s ex-
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ample and Campbell’s original discussion. Perhaps the most striking is that Campbell
never actually employs the term “billiard ball model”. In fact, he does not refer to billiard
balls once! His analogy is more generally with a system of perfectly elastic macroscopic
balls – and, of course, billard balls are an approximate instance of these, even though
they are not in reality perfectly elastic. But the analogy is fit for most relevant purposes,
since it captures some essential aspects of the relationship between the laws that apply
to both gas molecules and macroscopic yet point-size elastic balls. As Campbell writes:
“The propositions of the hypothesis of the dynamical theory of gases display an analogy
[...] to the laws which would describe the motion of a large number of infinitely small and
highly elastic bodies contained in a cubical box.” (1957, 128). There are however some
important points of difference where the model most definitely goes astray, and they can
not be understood to be part of Hesse’s negative analogy, since they comprise properties of
the gas molecules that the model fails to describe correctly altogether. These properties,
which comprise what we refer to as the inverse negative analogy, include free expansion,
but also thermal conductivity, and viscosity. As Campbell puts it: “The relation predicted
[between pressure, density, and temperature of the gas and its viscosity] does not accord
with that determined experimentally; in particular it is found that the theory predicts that
the coefficient of viscosity will be be determined by the size and shape of the containing
vessel, whereas experiment shows that it depends, in a given gas, only on the density and
temperature.” (ibid., 134).
While there is no space here to discuss the details fully, the considerations above already
suggest the following distinctions with respect to the ways in which the elastic macroscopic
balls model misrepresents gases. First of all, there are all the properties of the model
elements which are missing in the gases: they constitute the negative analogy in Hesse’s
terms. Thus billiard balls are shiny and hard, but gas molecules are not (they are neither
hard nor soft; neither shiny nor opaque). We may then say that the model pretends with
respect to its target system. It may seem easy to discharge these properties by simply
redefining the model to include only the positive and neutral analogies. Thus, one may
insist, the analogy is not meant with billiard balls per se but with constructs that are
like billiard balls except in those respects in which billiard balls are positively unlike gas
molecules. But there are a number of problems with this strategy, some of which were
already discussed by Hesse. For a start, the move is of course circular as a definition of the
function of the analogy – since it requires us to already have a hang on what properties are
and are not actually analogous. And things get even worse when we notice that there are
also properties of gases that the system of elastic balls – whether or not billiard balls – can
not possibly be said to have, including thermal conductivity, viscosity and free expansion.
This is the inverse negative analogy we are emphasizing here and we may say that the
model abstracts in this case. The analogy as based upon the model denies that the gas has
these properties. In some cases the model even positively misleads regarding the character
of such properties in the gas. If we consider viscosity in the example above, we see that
the fact that the model fails to describe it correctly depends on the fact that it abstracts
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from density and temperature on which viscosity actually depends. Instead, according to
the model, viscosity rather depends on properties the billiard ball model pretends about,
such as the size and shape of the containing vessel. In these cases we concurrently abstract
and pretend about a property of the target system, thus simulating it. We then say that a
model lies about its target whenever it is deceptive in this sense about it. There is no sense
in which this can be put down to mere “heuristics”. Rather, as Campbell insists, the model
analogy is not to be considered a mere heuristics in the development of a new theory, but
must be understood to be part of the theory itself: “It is often suggested that the analogy
leads to the formulation of the theory, but that once the theory is formulated the analogy
has served its purpose and may be removed and forgotten. Such a suggestion is absolutely
false and perniciously misleading” (1957, 129).
Thus we must take seriously that models misrepresent by abstracting away, and thus ig-
noring, certain properties of the target system (escape velocity), by pretending that certain
properties of the target system do obtain which actually do not (hardness and shine) and
by simulating, that is, by misleadingly denying that some properties obtain which in fact
do (viscosity, thermal conductivity). What’s more for some and the very same elements, a
model will typically both abstract with respect to some property, and pretend with respect
to some other. In other words, the representation by models will typically involve both
ignoring certain properties that do obtain and postulating other properties that do not
obtain even for the very same sets of elements in the domain of the model.
Now, let us attempt to represent these distinctions somewhat more formally, in what we
regard as a hospitable framework for structuralism, which assumes that there are uncontro-
versial structural representations of both source and target. This is a strong assumption,
but without which the structuralist conception of representation does not even get off the
ground.3 Thus consider a model and its target as two relational structures, B = 〈B, (RB)〉
and A = 〈A, (RA)〉, with their own domains of individuals, A and B, and the sets of re-
lations defined over the domains: respectively (RA) and (RB). A and B are assumed to
be similar structures: while the elements of A and B may be different, the corresponding
relations in RA and in RB have the same number of arguments (Dunn and Hardegree 2001,
3One of the referees points out that this is in fact an incredibly strong assumption. As he or she puts it:
“A system of gas molecules is not a set of elements and a family of labelled relations, etc. It has no labelled
relations because it contains no labels [...] The real world thing being represented is not a structure, whereas
the author’s ‘target’ has to be a structure for the author’s discussion to make any sense at all”. We agree
wholeheartedly with this referee. It is indeed the case that a real physical object, a system, or a phenomenon,
can only be said to be a structure under a description. And it is clear (as one of us has often pointed out, in
e.g. Sua´rez (2010, p.96)) that any structural description is necessarily vastly underdetermined: Every real
object exemplifies multiple, perhaps an infinite number of, structures. This simple fact puts great pressure
upon structuralist claims regarding ontology (to the extent that claims to the effect that the “world consists
only of structure” or some such thing, are rendered vacuous or, worse, incoherent – as pointed out by e.g.
van Fraassen (2006).) We ignore this issue because almost all the literature that we do address ignores it
too, and also because it can only strengthen our critique of the homomorphism theory of representation.
But it is worth pointing out with the referee that general widespread acquiescence with a false assumption
does not make it any less false or unwarranted.
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10).
We use the bar symbol for tuples of elements of A and B: a¯ = (a1, ..., an) ∈ An and
b¯ = (b1, ..., bn) ∈ Bn.
We say that a model B abstracts some property RAj ⊆ An, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, of a target
system A if and only if there exists a¯ ∈ An such that RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)), where RBj ⊆ Bn
is the corresponding relation of RAj in B and f is a mapping from A to B. The abstracted
properties are in the inverse negative analogy, or negative analogy by denial. We then say
that the model B pretends some property RBk ∈ Bn, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, of the target system A
if and only if there exists b¯ ∈ Bn and a¯ ∈ An such that b¯ = f(a¯) and ¬RAk (a¯) ∧ RBk (f(a¯)),
where RAk ⊆ An is the corresponding relation of RBk in A. The pretended properties are
typically in the negative analogy as originally discussed by Hesse. Finally, we say that
a model B simulates a target A when it both abstracts and pretends some properties of
the same elements of A and of their images in B; formally, for some tuple a¯ ∈ An with
b¯ = f(a¯) ∈ Bn, some RAj , RAk ⊆ An and RBj , RBk ⊆ Bn, it is true that RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯))
and ¬RAk (a¯) ∧RBk (f(a¯)).
We have argued in this section, by appeal to a well-known foundational example in the
literature, that models typically simulate their targets, by both abstracting some of their
properties away and misleadingly asserting some of the properties they do not actually
possess. We next turn to the best candidate we know for a structuralist conception of rep-
resentation, namely Bartels’ homomorphism theory, and argue that it can not accommodate
these features.
3 Bartels’ Homomorphism Theory and the ‘Representational
Mechanism’
The main tenets of a structural account of scientific representation can be summarized as
follows: (i) model sources and their targets exemplify, instantiate, possess or at any rate
may be described as relational structures in the sense of mathematical logic, or set-theory;
(ii) a model represents a target system only if the relations in the target are partially or
totally transferred to the model via some sort of morphism.
We have provided a definition for relational structure in the previous section. The
transfer required by condition (ii) is accomplished by some function f : A → B. In model
theory a twofold role is ascribed to f . As a mapping, f assures that each individual in
A has one, and only one, corresponding element (an image) in B. But in addition, as a
morphism, f is a structure preserving mapping and it assures that related objects possess
related properties. The existence of a morphism between the model and its target is what
the advocates of the structural approach take to be the condition for representation: a
model B represents a target system A (if and) only if B is to some extent morphic to A.
Isomorphism is sometimes advocated as the basic morphism between structures. For
f : A → B to be an isomorphism, several conditions need to be met. First, f : A → B
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must be a bijective function, that is, for every b ∈ B there exists an a ∈ A such that
f(a) = b (also known as surjectivity) and, for every a, a′ ∈ A, if a 6= a′ then f(a) 6=
f(a′) (injectivity). Second, for all j and all elements ai of A: RAj (a1, ..., an) if and only
if RBj (f(a1), ..., f(an)). In other words, all relations in A are transferred to B so that
the two structures are relationally identical, in the sense that the properties they define
have identical features. (The structures themselves are obviously not identical since their
domains contain different elements).
The idea that isomorphism may constitute representation has been criticized on sev-
eral grounds. There are first of all urgent questions regarding the fundamental assumption
that model sources and targets are or may be said to possess structures. For instance, van
Fraassen (2008) suggests that isomorphism alone cannot serve as a condition of representa-
tion because, he argues, the structure A is a “relevant mathematical representation” (ibid,
243) of the target system to be represented only by construction. That is, we must first of
all choose a domain of elements A and a set RA of relations for it as a description of the
target system or phenomenon. The claim that a model B is isomorphic to A, which allows
to use B as a representation of A, depends on the prior act of construction of A which is
essentially a conventional and pragmatic choice.
Another class of objections, raised by Sua´rez (2003) and reiterated by Frigg (2006),
undermine the attempt to reduce representation to the relation of isomorphism, irrespective
of whether the fundamental assumption that model sources and targets are structures
or may be described as such. Thus the logical argument shows that isomorphism and
representation do not share logical properties: while isomorphism is reflexive, symmetric
and transitive, representation is non-reflexive, non-symmetric and non-transitive. The non-
sufficiency and non-necessity arguments show that representation may fail to obtain when
isomorphism holds (non-sufficiency), and may obtain when isomorphism does not (non-
necessity). Finally the misrepresentation argument appeals to the already mentioned fact
that inaccuracy is intrinsic to all scientific representation, while isomorphism seems to leave
no room for either incomplete or incorrect representation.
In response to these objections the advocates of the structuralist account have proposed
weakenings of the isomorphism relation. For instance, Andreas Bartels (2006) suggests that
homomorphism will serve to overcome at least the misrepresentation objection. Roughly
speaking, what allegedly makes homomorphism immune to the criticisms undermining iso-
morphism is the fact that homomorphism allows some parts of the model not to have
any counterparts in the target, thus leaving the necessary room to account for inaccurate
representation.
Bartels explicitly endorses the structural account of representation when he claims that
homomorphism is a necessary condition for representation: “something, B, can represent
something, A, only if some structure of the represented domain A is transferred to its image
B” (ibid., 7) and that: “B represents A only if B is a homomorphic image of A” (ibid., 8).
The homomorphism account of representation advocated by Bartels in fact comprises two
parts. One part is purely formal, and treats homomorphism model-theoretically. The other
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part concerns the application of the concept ‘being homomorphic to’ and claims that this
concept is extensionally equivalent to ‘to potentially represent ’. Both the formal and the
extensional analyses of homomorphism provided by Bartels play a role in his attempt to
show that homomorphism accounts for misrepresentation, so let us look at them in turn.
According to Bartels’ definitions, the following three conditions must obtain for a struc-
ture B to be homomorphic to A: for all j, all (a1, ..., an) in An, and all (f(a1), ..., f(an)) in
Bn:
Completeness: if RAj (a1, ..., an), then R
B
j (f(a1), ..., f(an)) (1)
Faithfulness: if RBj (f(a1), ..., f(an)) then R
A
j (a1, ..., an) (2)
Surjectivity: for every b ∈ B, there exists a ∈ A such that f(a) = b (3)
The condition of surjectivity on f assures that all the elements in B are images of one
or more element in A. Completeness rules out the possibility that there is a relation in
A which has not a counterpart in B, so that the information that B provides about A is
complete. On the other hand, faithfulness rules out that there is a relation in B which has
not a counterpart in A, so that B provides a faithful snapshot of the relational framework
in A. We then say that B is homomorphic to A.
The relation of homomorphism thus defined identifies the set or class of structures
to which any structure B is homomorphic, what we may call its homomorphism class.
According to Bartels, these structures constitute the representational content of B, that
is, they are all potential representational targets of B. In order for any of these potential
targets to turn into the actual target of B, a representational mechanism must pick it
out from the homomorphism class as the target for B. A representational mechanism can
be of two kinds: it may arise from an agent’s intentions and purposes (an intentional
representational mechanism), or it may be the result of naturally occurring causal relations
(a causal representational mechanism). In the first case, the selection of the actual target
from the homomorphism class is arbitrary, depending entirely on an agent’s purposes,
while in the second case the selection is driven by some causal facts that are independent
of the agent. In either case, the representational mechanism has in effect the absolutely
ineliminable role of picking out the actual representational target of a particular model
B. In spite of this, Bartels claims that his theory retains its structural character, since
homomorphism is nonetheless “the necessary condition of correct actual representation”
(ibid., 12). Let us inspect this claim a little closer.
Two forms of misrepresentation are generally considered in the literature: inaccuracy
and mistargetting.4 The three kinds of misrepresentation presented in Section 1 all lead to
inaccuracy, which is misrepresentation in the broad sense. As for mistargetting, it is “the
phenomenon of mistaking the target of a representation” (Sua´rez 2003, 233).
Now, homomorphism theory is claimed by Bartels to be conceptually adequate, that is, it
sharply distinguishes cases where B represents, B does not represent, and B misrepresents.
4While misrepresentation as inaccuracy is taken into account in Cartwright (1983), Giere (1988), Teller
(2001, 2008), Sua´rez (2003, 2004), Frigg (2006), van Fraassen (2008), Pincock (2011), Contessa (2011),
misrepresentation as mistargetting is presented in Sua´rez (2003, 2004).
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This claim is relevant insofar conceptual inadequacy is the usual grounds against structural
accounts in the literature. Indeed, it is argued, the fact that structural accounts treat
morphisms as necessary conditions for representation leaves no room for the intermediate
condition ‘there is representation and it is incorrect ’: either there exists a morphism from A
to B, hence representation, or there exist not morphism and representation does not obtain.
According to Bartels, such a charge would be unfair to his homomorphism theory.
Indeed, the distinction between the representational content of B and its target allows the
theory to account for the following situation:
If a reference object for B [B] is chosen by a representational mechanism out
of the set of objects potentially represented by B [B], then B [B] will correctly
represent this object. If a reference object for B [B] is chosen which does not
belong to this set, then this reference object will be misrepresented by B [B].
Thus, the case in which something A [A] is misrepresented by B [B] and the
case in which A [A] is not represented by B [B] (i.e. A [A] is not a reference
object of B [B]) are clearly distinct. (2006, 14)
The distinction between target and content of B plays then a crucial role in accommodat-
ing those intermediate cases where representation occurs, and it is not correct. In order
to illustrate misrepresentation thus conceived, let’s consider a universe of discourse which
allows the following five structures {B,A1,A2,A3,A4}. Among the five structures, only A1
and A2 are homomorphic to B. We call H the set containing A1 and A2, which then con-
stitute the representational content of B. Now suppose that a representational mechanism
picks A3 as the target of B, thus misrepresenting A3. Consequently, structure A4 is neither
a potential target of B, nor misrepresented by B. Providing a sharp distinction between
representing (picking a target within H), non-representing (having a structure neither be-
longing to H nor picked by a representational mechanism), and misrepresenting (having
a structure not belonging to H and nonetheless picked as a target), the homomorphism
theory has the resources to satisfy conceptual adequacy, thus explaining misrepresentation.
In particular, this notion of misrepresentation may be seen to be addressing directly the
concerns raised by Sua´rez (2003) about mistargetting: the act of ascribing a target out-
side the representational content of B may be thought to make his notion of mistargetting
precise.
However, Bartels’ homomorphism is only allegedly conceptually adequate. Bartels
claims that we have misrepresentation if a representational mechanism picks a target for
B outside the set H of all the structures B is homomorphic to. Misrepresentation is then
the act performed by a representational mechanism to choose as a target for B a structure
which B is not homomorphic to. Of course, homomorphism is necessary to identify the
set H of structures over which neither non-representation nor misrepresentation can occur.
However, before a representational mechanism choses a target for B among the structures
outside H, any of these structures could be either misrepresented or non-represented at all.
Therefore, it is the choice made by a representational mechanism to actually determine
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which structure is misrepresented and, consequently, which one is not represented. In other
words, homomorphism alone can not help in sharply distinguishing representation, non-
representation and misrepresentation. This is because misrepresentation is after all a case
of representation – just an incorrect one. Homomorphism was never supposed for Bartels to
be a sufficient condition for representation (or mis-representation). But what his discussion
of the representational mechanism reveals at this point is that he does not actually take
it to be necessary either – since the representational mechanism on its own, on Bartels’
admission, is able to select a representational target, whether it be one outside or inside the
homomorphism class. (Otherwise we could not even express the thought that the structure
A3 outside the homomorphism class is mis-represented.) It follows that being picked out by
the representational mechanism is what is really necessary, regardless of homomorphism.5
Nonetheless, the non-sufficiency of homomorphism undermines the conceptual adequacy
invoked for the theory built on it. That “a representational intention has to occur” (p.
12) in order to finalize the distinction between the non-represented and the misrepresented
contravenes the claim that homomorphism “permits” misrepresentation. As Bartels claims,
the reason why homomorphism could be claimed to fail conceptual adequacy is that “a ho-
momorphism between relational structures [A] and [B] either exists or does not exist; in the
first case, [B] represents [A], whereas in the second case [B] does not represent [A]”, thus
leaving unexplained “What would it mean for [B] to represent [A], but incorrectly?”. We
have shown that Bartels’ theory does not break this deadlock: if there is homomorphism,
there is representation; if there is not, we are left with an indistinct whole where it is not
clear what is not represented and what is misrepresented.
Bartel’s homomorphism theory falls short also as an account of misrepresentation as
mistargetting. For the original objection raised by Sua´rez was not reliant on the possibility
of ascribing a target that lies outside of the homomorphism class. To pursue the example
above, the objection does not trade on the actual representational target A3 lying outside
the homomorphism class at all. The objection can be entirely run within the homomorphism
class, and in fact it properly belongs there. For Sua´rez’s point is that the mistaken target is
assumed wrongly to be the target precisely because it holds the required structural relation,
and merely on account of this fact. The point of misrepresentation by mistargetting is rather
that no structural characterization can distinguish structures within the homomorphism
class regardless of whether they are or not picked out as the actual target. In other words,
suppose that the representational mechanism above picked out A1 as the representational
target of B and that someone mistakenly identifies A2 as the target for B. Then there is
no available structural characterization of this mistake since both structures are on equal
terms in the homomorphism class of B. It should be clear that this point survives Bartels’
5In fact, Bartels’ attempt to accommodate the conceptual adequacy seems to resolve in a form of defla-
tionary, or functional, account. Deflationary (Sua´rez 2004) or functional (Chakravartty 2010) approaches
treat representation as a function of models which allows model users to gain information about the target
at stake via the model. The ascription, or recognition, of the representational function of a model by a user
is then essential to have representation. The crucial role played by the representational mechanism’s choice
in Bartels’ homomorphism theory puts his theory very much in line with those accounts.
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disquisition in the quote above entirely.
Homomorphism theory seems then to fall short of what would be required for an ade-
quate account of scientific representation even by Bartels’ own standards. What we need
to see now is whether the homomorphism theory fares any better in dealing with misrepre-
sentation as inaccuracy, which is after all where the promise of the account lies in the first
place.
4 Structural Morphisms and Representational Inaccuracy
We need to see now if the formal analysis fares any better than the extensional analysis
and enables the homomorphism account to accommodate the inaccuracy kinds of misrep-
resentation. We have seen that Bartels identifies three conditions for homomorphism (sect.
3): completeness, faithfulness and the condition that the f : A → B be surjective. These
conditions, if weakened, might “fit the cases in which representations do not work perfectly”
(Bartels 2006, 9). In such cases, Bartels argues, representation may either “lead to false
expectations concerning facts in the represented domain” or “blur some of the fine grained
differences existing in the represented domain” (ibid.). These are precisely cases of mis-
representation as inaccuracy. In particular, they do recall the formulation we put forward
for, respectively, pretending and abstracting. This is why in what follows we treat Bar-
tels’ formal analysis of homomorphism as an attempt to accommodate misrepresentation
as inaccuracy.
4.1 Homomorphism versus Epimorphism
Before proceeding, we need to point out a technical issue about the notion of homomorphism
advocated by Bartels. In the literature, the only condition required for homomorphism is
completeness, i.e., the condition which assures that every fact in A has a corresponding
(atomic or relational) fact in B.6 On the other hand, a surjective homomorphism is the con-
dition for B to be the homomorphic image of A.7 Therefore, the notion of homomorphism
that Bartels is appealing to does not coincide with the standard notion of homomorphism
nor with homomorphic image. Indeed, besides completeness and surjectivity of f , Bartels
requires an additional condition, namely faithfulness:
If (i) [faithfulness] and (ii) [completeness] are fulfilled, f is a homomorphism
from A onto B, and B, by virtue of the existence of f , can be said to be an
homomorphic image. (Bartels 2006, 8)
6See Chang and Keisler (1973), Dunn and Hardegree (2001), Hodges (1997), Hodges and Scanlon (2013)
7“A relational structure B is said to be a homomorphic image of A if there exists a homomorphism from
A to B that is onto B (in symbols, B = h∗(A)). (A function f maps A onto B [it should be A onto B] if
for every b ∈ B there is an a ∈ A such that h(a) = b).” (Dunn and Hardegree 2001, 15). Read the bold
character in the quote as our A and B.
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It should be noted, however, that a homomorphic image is not necessarily also a faithful
one. Indeed, the structure B can be a homomorphic image of A and yet bear a relation RBj
which has no counterpart in A.8
Our claim is that the morphism on which Bartels grounds his structural account is not
really homomorphism. Indeed, Bartels claims for the kind of morphism employed in his
theory more properties than those exhibited by standard homomorphism, i.e., surjectivity
and faithfulness. A good candidate for the notion of homomorphism as employed by Bartels
is the notion of epimorphism as presented by Rothmaler (2005, sect.2, 474), who claims for
it the same properties as Bartels: surjectivity, faithfulness and completeness.9 Although
Rothmaler’s notion as well is not standard, we find it appealing for two reasons. First, it
helps us to provide a reliable taxonomy of morphisms, which has been long overdue in the
literature. Second, the taxonomy thus obtained is a useful device to evaluate the adequacy
of those theories of representation built on morphisms, as shown in section 4.2.
We can now consider the weakenings which, according to Bartels, allow epimorphism to
accommodate misrepresentation as inaccuracy. The first form of weakening is on faithful-
ness and it leads to the notion of minimal fidelity (Bartels 2006, 9). While faithfulness in
its original formulation (2) requires that the implication RBj (f(a¯)) → RAj (a¯) holds for all
the counterimages of f(a¯) ∈ Bn, all j, RAj ∈ An, and RBj ∈ Bn, minimal fidelity allows the
implication to hold for some of the counterimages only. In other words, minimal fidelity
admits the following case:
there exists a tuple b¯ ∈ Bn and a¯ ∈ An, f(a¯) = b¯: RBj (f(a¯)) ∧ ¬RAj (a¯) (4)
The fact that epimorphism is not necessarily injective is crucial here since a one–to–one
correspondence between the arguments in A and their images in B would make the condi-
tions of faithfulness and minimal fidelity equivalent: given that each bi ∈ B in the range
of f has only one counterimage ai ∈ An, it is just equivalent to claim that the conditional
RBj (b¯ = f(a¯))→ RAj (a¯) holds for all the tuples of counterimages of b¯ = f(a¯) ∈ Bn, or that
it holds for at least one tuple.
8Consider two similar structures, A = 〈A, (RA1 , RA2 )〉 and A = 〈B, (RB1 , RB2 )〉, with A ∈ A =
{a1, a2, a3, a4}, B ∈ B = {b1, b2, b3}. The mapping f : A → B is surjective, and the condition of complete-
ness holds. Therefore, B is a homomorphic image of A. To find a case where the conditions of completeness
and the surjectivity of f (and A and B are similar structures) are satisfied, but B is not faithful, we need
a relation RBj ∈ B which has no counterpart RAj ∈ A and, at the same time, we need to assure that all
the relations in A have their counterparts in B. The function f : A → B is surjective (and not injec-
tive) and ascribes to each argument the following images: f(a1) = b1, f(a2) = b2, f(a3) = b3, f(a4) = b3.
Consider now the case that A has the following family of relations: RA1 ⊆ A2 = {(a1, a2), (a1, a3)} and
RA2 ⊆ A2 = {(a1, a2), (a3, a4)}. As for B: RB1 ⊆ B2 = {(b1, b2), (b1, b3)} and RB2 ⊆ B2 = {(b2, b1), (b3, b2)}.
The relation RB1 in B thus corresponds to both the relation RA1 and RA2 in A, while the relation RB2 has no
counterpart in A. Therefore, B is a homomorphic image of A while faithfulness is violated.
9The standard definition of epimorphism is “surjective homomorphism”. Therefore Rothmaler adds
faithfulness as a further condition. As it will turn out in section 4.2, this notion of epimorphism works fine
also to distinguish the conditions for having epimorphism from those required for having a “homomorphic
image”.
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The second form of weakening is on completeness, and it admits the case where some,
or even all the relations in A are not preserved in B. Weakening on completeness can take
two forms: either some relations in A are not represented at all in B, or some n−tuples in A
are not represented at all in B (which is to say, some n−tuples of images in B do not stand
in any relation of 〈RB〉 although their counterimages stand in the corresponding relations
〈RA〉).
It is worth noticing at this point the major difference between these two types of weak-
enings. The weakened form of faithfulness is a proper condition, in the sense that it does
impose some restrictions on the transfer of structure: it cannot be the case that a relation
in A does not have a corresponding relation representing it in B. The weakened form of
completeness, on the other hand, is not a condition at all, it rather consists in allowing
any possible scenario, which is forecast by Bartels himself: “The fewer relations for which
the transfer of structure holds, and the fewer the number of elements of A to which the
transfer is restricted, the poorer the representation will be with respect to content. In an
extreme case, no content will be left” (ibid., 11). Another, more astonishing, fact about
weakened completeness is that it is a violation of the very minimal condition required for
the transfer of structure (i.e. completeness) and, therefore, for there being a morphism at
all. Indeed, to restrict the transfer of structure either to a certain range of arguments or
to certain subsets of relations implies that f is, respectively, neither a well-defined func-
tion nor a proper morphism. Thus no attempt to ground the representational relation on
weakened completeness may be interpreted as providing a meaningful structural account of
representation given that the very notion of morphism on which the account is claimed to
be built would be left out. The relevant weakenings must be of a different kind. Let us see
what Bartels proposes in order to accommodate inaccurate representations.
4.2 Morphisms and Misrepresentation (as Inaccuracy)
In the previous section we have introduced the weakenings which, according to Bartels, al-
low to accommodate misrepresentation as inaccuracy. In order to see whether they actually
accomplish the task, here we confront each morphism, both in its standard and weakened
version, with the formalized versions of abstraction, pretence and simulation that we intro-
duced in Section 2. For the sake of completeness, our analysis will include also isomorphism
which, as mentioned in the previous sections, is the morphism employed in other structural
accounts. Isomorphism demands the following conditions to be satisfied: completeness,
faithfulness, and that the mapping f : A→ B be both injective and surjective.10 Our goal
is then to verify that for every morphism there exists at least one form of misrepresentation
which is not accommodated, thus showing that none of the three morphisms account for
misrepresentation as inaccuracy. For the sake of clarity, we recapitulate in table (1) the
conditions for each morphism, marking with a star the weakened morphisms that we have
10Dunn and Hardegree (2001, 17) consider the injectivity and surjectivity of f only as a condition for
isomorphism. Chang and Keisler (1973, 21), Hodges (1997, 5) and Robinson (1963, 25) consider also
faithfulness as a condition for isomorphism.
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Morphism Characteristic Conditions
Homomorphism completeness
Epimorphism surjectivity of f , completeness, faithfulness
Epimorphism∗c surjectivity of f , weak completeness, faithfulness
Epimorphism∗f surjectivity of f , completeness, weak faithfulness
Isomorphism surjectivity and injectivity of f , completeness, faithfulness
Isomorphism∗c surjectivity and injectivity of f , weak completeness, faithfulness
Isomorphism∗f surjectivity and injectivity of f , completeness, weak faithfulness
Epimorphism∗c,f surjectivity of f , weak completeness, weak faithfulness
Isomorphism∗c,f surjectivity and injectivity of f , weak completeness, weak faith-
fulness
Table 1: Morphisms
discussed.
Two things need to be noted before proceeding. First, cases where the morphisms are
weakened on completeness are not to be considered since, for the reasons presented in the
previous section, they are not morphisms at all. Second, in table (1) the following two
cases are not listed: the case of a surjective homomorphism, and the case of a faithful
homomorphism (without surjectivity). The first case satisfies the conditions for B to be a
homomorphic image of A. The surjectivity of f : A → B, however, is neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for homomorphism, so it can be omitted for the sake of argument
without any loss of generality. On the other hand, a faithful homomorphism f which is not
surjective is not an interesting case to consider, since faithfulness holds for the elements in
B which are in the range of f : A→ B only. And so in what follows, these quantifiers will
be omitted whenever redundant.
We consider abstraction first, which we have formalized as follows:
∃j, RAj ⊆ An, RBj ⊆ Bn,∃a¯ ∈ An : RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)) (5)
Let’s start with homomorphism. The formula (1) describing the completeness condition
is logically equivalent to the following formula: ¬RAj (a¯) ∨ RBj (f(a¯)) whose logical con-
tradiction ¬(¬RAj (a¯) ∨ RBj (f(a¯))) is, in turn, equivalent to the formula for abstracting
RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)). In other words, the condition of completeness is logically incompat-
ible with abstraction. Yet, epimorphism and isomorphism, both in their standard version
and in the version where only faithfulness is weakened, all satisfy completeness. There-
fore epimorphism, epimorphismf , isomorphism and isomorphismf are logically unsuited to
accommodate abstraction.
The second form of misrepresentation is pretence, which we have formalized as follows:
∃j, RAj ⊆ An, RBj ⊆ Bn, ∃b¯ ∈ Bn, a¯ ∈ An, b¯ = f(a¯) : ¬RAj (a¯) ∧RBj (f(a¯)) (6)
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We have just seen that homomorphism and, more precisely, the condition of complete-
ness, is logically equivalent to the formula: ¬RAj (a¯) ∨ RBj (f(a¯)). Hence, homomorphism
allows for pretence as a logical possibility. On the other hand, pretence logically contradicts
faithfulness. Indeed, the formula (2) for faithfulness is equivalent to RAj (a¯) ∨ ¬RBj (f(a¯))
whose logical contradiction is exactly ¬RAj (a¯) ∧ RBj (f(a¯)). Therefore, any morphism that
satisfies faithfulness can not accommodate pretence. This evidently holds for epimorphism
and isomorphism. What about the weakened version of faithfulness ? We have seen that
weakening faithfulness admits of a tuple a¯ ∈ A which does not stand in relation RAj ⊆ An
even though its image b¯ ∈ B stands in the the corresponding relation RBj ⊆ Bn. Weak-
ened faithfulness, then, allows pretence in principle. However, for weakened faithfulness to
actually accommodate pretence, it is crucial that the function f is not injective, otherwise
weakened faithfulness can not accommodate pretence. Therefore, epimorphism∗f accom-
modates pretence, but epimorphism, isomorphism and isomorphism∗f do not accommodate
this form of misrepresentation.
The third form of misrepresentation is simulation, which we have formalized as follows:
∃j, k,RAj , RAk ⊆ An, RBj , RBk ⊆ Bn, ∃a¯ ∈ An, b¯ ∈ Bn, b¯ = f(a¯) :
(RAj (a¯) ∧ ¬RBj (f(a¯)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
abstracting on a¯,b¯
∧ (¬RAk (a¯) ∧RBk (f(a¯)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
pretending on a¯,b¯
(7)
Simulation is what obtains from both abstracting and pretending on the same tuple, which
is a common phenomenon in modeling (as stressed by Cartwright 1989, Frigg and Hart-
mann 2006). In this case, it is much easier to verify which form of misrepresentation is
accommodated by which kind of morphism, given that we just need to jointly consider
what abstracting and pretending allow for. It is then the case that only homomorphism∗c
and epimorphism∗f,c accommodate simulation, and neither of them are proper morphisms
that can transfer structure.
In table (2) we summarize the results of our analysis, which leads us to conclude that
no morphism that can be said to transfer structure from a source to a target is actually
able to accommodate all forms of inaccurate misrepresentation. The structural mappings
that merely satisfy weakened versions of completeness can not be said to transfer structure,
and the rest are unable to accommodate at least one main form of misrepresentation as
inaccuracy. Therefore we conclude that isomorphism, epimorphism and homomorphism all
fail to account for the phenomenon of misrepresentation.
It is in particular startling that most of the structural accounts proposed so far fail to
accommodate the one form of misrepresentation as abstraction that philosophers of science
have entertained ever since the times of Cambpell’s influential discussion of the kinetic the-
ory of gases. While structural mappings can be very helpful in establishing the accuracy of
certain mathematical representations in physics, they are unable to characterize the very
relation of representation in general.
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Abstraction Pretence Simulation
Homomorphism NO YES NO
Epimorphism NO NO NO
Epimorphism∗f NO YES NO
Isomorphism NO NO NO
Isomorphism∗f YES NO NO
Table 2: Morphisms and Inaccuracy
5 Conclusions
We have examined Bartels’ homomorphism theory of scientific representation. We have
examined it in relation to two typical kinds of misrepresentation in scientific models, which
we may refer to as ‘mistargetting’ and ‘inaccuracy’. The former involves choosing the wrong
target for a modeling source on account of perceived similarities or structural matches,
and shows representation to be an essentially intentional notion (in a broad sense that
encompasses intended use). The latter involves at least three different kinds of distortion
of model targets by model sources, which we have distinguished as abstraction, pretence
and simulation. We have illustrated these distinctions by means of a careful study of the
historical case of the billiard ball model. This model was notoriously invoked by Mary
Hesse in her rightly influential work on analogy. Nevertheless Hesse’s treatment of the
model is itself highly idealized. We claim that there is more to the actual case study
than just positive and negative analogies in the sense discussed by Hesse. In particular
there are inverse negative analogies, or analogies ‘by denial’, as well as negative analogies
by ‘abstraction’: there are properties of gas molecules that billiard balls lack, as well as
properties of billiard balls that gas molecules lack. We then endeavored to provide formal
characterizations for all these distinctions in a form that is suitable to the homomorphism
account of representation. The taxonomy thus obtained proves useful to determine whether
homomorphism – or indeed any other kind of morphism – accommodates misrepresentation.
We share with Bartels the thought that the adequacy of any account of scientific rep-
resentation demands such accommodation. Any adequate account must at least accommo-
date, if not explain, mistargetting and the three kinds of inaccuracy we have discussed. Now,
as for mistargetting, we have examined whether Bartels’ account successfully cope with it.
A closer analysis has revealed some issues remain regarding how much work effectively ho-
momorphism is doing in the account. We have argued that the representational mechanism
that Bartels appeals to is crucial in determining representation,misrepresentation or non-
representation. Thus, there does not seem to be much work left for homomorphism to do.
Bartels does claim that homomorphism is necessary for representation or misrepresentation
alike, yet his actual discussion of the role played by the representational mechanism seems
prima facie to belie this claim. As for the three forms of inaccuracy that we have discussed,
we have provided arguments to the effect that while homomorphism may account for pre-
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tence – although not in the form of epimorphism actually defended by Bartels – it can not
provide for abstraction. We thus concluded that, contrary to Bartels’ claim, the homomor-
phism account can not provide for any of the two typical kinds of misrepresentation by
scientific models.
A structural account may well be needed to assess the accuracy or faithfulness of a
scientific model, particularly in those cases where the model source and target can both be
given appropriate structural descriptions. Nonetheless, even in such cases, it does not seem
to be the case that the representational relation, or activity, is constituted by any structural
morphism. It is rather what Bartels refers to as the “representational mechanism” that does
all the conceptually required work at this stage. Once this basic mechanism is in place,
it becomes appropriate to ask questions regarding the structural match of sources and
targets. Representation does not essentially consist in transfer of structure from target
system to source object. And while the homomorphism account may describe the means
whereby some mathematical representations operate in science, it can not fully describe
representation per se.
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